Start with what would stop the week
Most small businesses already “have a backup” in some form: a USB in a drawer, a cloud folder, a nightly copy on a NAS, or a software vendor that says data lives in the cloud. The useful question is narrower. If this laptop died tonight, or a ransom note locked the shared drive, which systems would stop invoices, payroll, bookings or customer contact?
Write those systems down before you buy another drive. Typical ones are:
- the mailbox that customers and banks already trust
- invoicing and payment records
- customer files and job notes
- website and domain settings, if you run them yourself
- point-of-sale or booking tools
- photos or scans of paper records you still rely on
Cloud software can be a genuine backup for that one product, but it is not a backup of everything else on the office PC. Treat each system separately.
Use a restore-test card, not a vague promise
Once a quarter, fill one line per system. Keep the card with your other incident notes, not only in the owner’s head.
- System name (for example, “invoices”, “shared job photos”, “owner mailbox”).
- Where the live copy lives.
- Where the backup lives (cloud service, external drive, or both).
- Who can restore it if the usual person is away.
- Date of the last restore that actually produced usable files.
- How long that restore took, in hours, not “it should be fine”.
The Australian Cyber Security Centre’s personal guidance is a good baseline for the copy itself: back up regularly, turn on automatic backups where you can, and use a secure cloud service, an external device, or both. Disconnect backup media when you are not using it. Keep an offline copy. Store that copy away from the live computer so a fire, theft or network-wide lockup does not take both.
If a restore has never been tried, you do not yet have a backup. You have a hope.
Keep at least one copy that ransomware cannot reach
Ransomware encrypts files and then asks for payment, often in cryptocurrency, to unlock them or to stop a leak. ACSC’s current advice is not to pay. Payment does not guarantee recovery and does not stop stolen data being shared.
A backup that stays plugged into the same PC or the same office network can be encrypted in the same incident. That is why an offline or disconnected copy matters, and why Network Attached Storage sitting on the office Wi-Fi is not automatically “offsite”.
A practical pattern for a small team:
- Let the accounting or email vendor hold the live service, with a login only the business controls.
- Keep an automatic cloud copy of the files you create locally.
- Once a week, update an external drive, eject it, and store it somewhere you can find in a hurry.
You do not need enterprise language for this. You need one copy that is not reachable while you work.
Check the backup before you restore it
ACSC’s ransomware steps are worth rehearsing while nothing is on fire:
- Record what you can see, including the ransom message. A photo of the screen is enough.
- Turn off the infected device. Unplug if you have to.
- Disconnect other important devices so the problem spreads less easily, starting with NAS boxes, servers and the computers that hold customer files.
- Change important passwords from a clean device, starting with cloud storage, email, banking and business accounts. Turn on multi-factor authentication where it is offered.
- Check backups before you reconnect them. If a backup lived on the infected machine or the same network, treat it as suspect and get help before you open it.
- Only restore from a copy you believe is clean, and only after the infected system has been reset or otherwise cleaned.
The same caution appears in ACSC malware-removal guidance: after a wipe, restore only if you are confident the backup is free of malware. Restoring the infected copy puts the problem straight back.
Know who you would tell
If customer personal information may have been involved, you may also have Privacy Act duties. That is separate from “getting the files back”. ACSC points businesses to ReportCyber and 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371), and to the OAIC’s Notifiable Data Breaches guidance where the Privacy Act applies. Do not wait for a perfect forensic report before you ask whether customers need a warning.
Some businesses also have extra rules about reporting a ransom payment. ACSC currently describes a 72-hour reporting form for businesses with annual turnover above $3 million, and for certain critical-infrastructure holders. If that might be you, check the live ransomware page rather than guessing.
Sources and further reading
Frequently asked questions
Is cloud storage enough?
It can be enough for the files you put there, if the login is protected and you can still get in after a laptop failure. It is not enough if the same account is signed in on an infected PC, or if the work you need still lives only on that PC.
How often should we test a restore?
Quarterly is a workable rhythm for a small team. Test the systems that would stop the week first. Write the date and the time it took. If nobody except one person can do it, that is a gap.
Should we pay if the backup fails?
ACSC’s public advice is not to pay. There is no guarantee you will get the files back, and payment does not stop data being leaked. Get professional help, report through ReportCyber, and restore only from a copy you believe is clean.
Keep going
If you want a short, practical session for the people who actually pay invoices and reset passwords, see our cyber safety training. For questions about courses or on-site sessions, use Contact Us.